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Does Decisional Law Grant Whites
Fewer Political Rights Under the
Fourteenth Amendment Than It Grants
to Racial Minorities?: A Response to
Vikram D. Amar and Evan H.
Caminker
By THOMAS E. WOOD*
Introduction
On November 5, 1996, the California electorate adopted Proposition
209, otherwise known as the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCR1), by a
margin of 54-46 percent! For the purposes of the present paper, the key
provisions of Proposition 209, which now comprises Article I, Section 31
of the state constitution, are as follows:
Prop 209: (a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferen-
tial treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race,
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of pub-
lic employment, public education, or public contracting ....
(f) For the purposes of this section, "state" shall include, but
not necessarily be limited to, the state itself, any city, county,
city and county, public university system, including the Uni-
versity of California, community college district, school dis-
* Executive Director, California Association of Scholars; co-author and co-
proponent, Proposition 209 (California Civil Rights Initiative) ("Prop. 209"); co-principal,
Californians Against Discrimination and Preferences ("CADAP"); co-principal, Americans
Against Discrimination and Preferences ("AADAP"). CADAP was a defendant intervenor
in Coalitionfor Economic Equity v. Wilson, cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 397 (1997), in which a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of Prop. 209 was successfully defended.
<wood@aadap.org>.
1. See Bill Jones, California Secretary of State, 1996 General Election Returns for
Ballot Propositions (visited Jan. 26, 1998) <http:/Note96.ss.cagovVote96/html/
votelprop/prop-209.961218083528.html>.
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trict, special district, or any other political subdivision or gov-
ernmental instrumentality of or within the state.2
Professors Vikram D. Amar and Evan H. Caminker have argued that
lower courts, at least, must hold Proposition 209 unconstitutional in light
of the Supreme Court precedent set in Washington v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).? This Article responds to the arguments
advanced by Amar and Caminker. It shows that under the Seattle prece-
dent it is not unconstitutional for a state to use a political decisionmaking
process, in this case, a statewide initiative, to constitutionalize a prohibi-
tion against race-conscious measures, even if the adoption of such a change
in policy makes it more difficult for minorities to obtain legislation at
lower levels of government. The Seattle ruling invalidates only those en-
actments that meet both of the following criteria: (1) the enactment ad-
dresses a specifically racial matter; and (2) it explicitly alters a political
decisionmaking process on that racial matter in a way that places a special
burden on minorities.
This Article discusses Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527
(1982), and demonstrates ways in which the Crawford decision provides
important corroborating evidence for this author's analysis of Seattle. The
Article also criticizes the Amar-Caminker interpretation of Seattle on the
grounds that it necessarily implies that minorities have political rights un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment that are denied to the majority.4
2. Proposition 209, in California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election Nov. 5, 1996 (en-
acted as CAL CONST. art. I, § 31).
3. See Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political
Burdens, and the CCRI, 23 HAsTIss CONsT. L.Q. 1019 (1996).
4. Amar and Caminker focus on race in their article, giving as one of their reasons that
the Seattle decision only addresses race. See Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1022 n.10.
Since this article is a response to Amar-Caminker, it too focuses on the criterion of race. It
should be noted that this writer maintains, as CADAP argued in federal court, that the
Hunter doctrine cannot be extended to cover the criterion of sex, for two reasons. First, un-
der the Federal Constitution, gender classifications are subject to a lower standard of review
than racial classifications. See, e.g., Mississippi University v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Second, race is at the core of the Hunter doctrine. Since women are not a minority group,
gender falls outside the scope of the Hunter doctrine. Women are both a demographic and a
political majority in California. See Telephone interview with Jim Fay, Dean of Humani-
ties, California State University at Hayward (Jan. 26, 1998) (citing CALMnoRNA ALMANAc
(Jim Fay ed., 5th ed. 1991) (Women and men comprise 50.7 percent and 49.3 percent of the
U.S. population, respectively, and 51 percent and 49 percent of the voting population, re-
spectively. See id. at 5, 290)). Women also comprised a majority of those who voted on
Proposition 209. See Exit polling, VoTE News SERvIcE, Nov. 5, 1997 (52 percent of those
who voted on Proposition 209 were women; of these, 52 percent voted for the measure, and
48 percent voted against it. Of white women who voted on the measure, 59 percent voted
for it; 41 percent voted against it.).
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Washington v. Seattle School District No. Vs
In 1978, the Seattle School District adopted a desegregation plan that
made extensive use of mandatory busing.! Subsequently, a group of citi-
zens in Seattle drafted Initiative 350, a statewide ballot measure which,
they hoped, would result in the termination of the Seattle busing plan and
racial busing in the State of Washington generally7 The key provision of
the measure read as follows:
mit. 350: Be it enacted by the People of the State of Washington:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the effective
date of this act no school board, school district, educational
service district board, educational service district, or county
committee, nor the superintendent of public instruction, nor the
state board of education, nor any of their respective employ-
ees, agents or delegates shall directly or indirectly require any
student to attend a school other than the school which is geo-
graphically nearest or next nearest the student's place of resi-
dence within the school district of his or her residence and
which offers the course of study pursued by such student...
The measure also set out a number of broad. exceptions to this re-
quirement.9 As qualified by the exceptions, the prohibition had the effect
of permitting mandatory busing for every purpose other than that of racial
balancing or integration of the schools.10 The measure also proscribed the
use of seven enumerated methods of indirect student assignment-among
them the redefinition of attendance zones, the pairing of schools, and the
use of "feeder" schools-which had figured in the Seattle plan." The ini-
tiative permitted racial busing in only one circumstance; it did not purport
to "prevent any court of competent jurisdiction from adjudicating constitu-
tional issues relating to the public schools."
12
Initiative 350 is distinguished from Proposition 209 in the following
ways. First, the people of the State of Washington did not adopt an anti-
busing policy when they passed Initiative 350. Indeed, as the Seattle Court
itself noted, the measure left the state legislature free to order such bus-
ing. 1 3 Proposition 209, on the other hand, is a substantive policy enacted at
5. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
6. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457,461 (1982).
7. See iL at 462.
8. 1979 Wash. Laws ch. 4, § 1 (Initiative Measure No. 350) (codified as amended at
WASH. REv. CODE§ 28A.26.010 (1981) (repealed 1991)).
9. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 457,462.
10. See id. at:457.
11. Seeiiat462-63.
12. Id. at463.
13. See ia at 474 ('hose favoring the elimination of defacto school segregation now
must seek relief from the state legislature, or from the statewide electorate." Id.).
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the highest level of state government, the constitution. As with virtually
all state constitutional amendments, its prohibitions are controlling over all
non-federal governmental entities and instrumentalities in the state.
Second, Initiative 350 explicitly altered the state's political decision-
making process on a particular issue; specifically, it removed decision-
making authority over mandatory racial busing from local school boards.
In this respect, too, it differs from Proposition 209, which has no language
that explicitly alters California's political decisionmaking process.
In 1982, the Court held, five to four, that Initiative 350 altered the po-
litical decisionmaking process in Washington State on a specifically racial
question in a way that placed special burdens on minorities in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 14 The problem be-
fore us is to understand this ruling and its implications, if any, for the ad-
judication of the constitutionality of California's Proposition 209.
A Divided Court
Does the Seattle decision immunize certain kinds of race-conscious
enactments by lower levels of government against race-neutral policies en-
icted by higher levels of government? On this fundamental point, a mi-
rority of the Seattle Court thought that it might.' 5 According to Justice
Powell, the Court's invalidation of Initiative 350 had arguably committed
the Court to the following positions, which he regarded as not merely un-
tenable, but absurd:
(1) the adoption of a neighborhood school policy by a local school
board is permissible under the Federal Constitution, but the adoption of
such a policy at the state level violates the Fourteenth Amendment;'
6
(2) while it would be constitutionally permissible for the Seattle
School District to change its mind and cancel its program of mandatory ra-
cial busing of its own volition, neither the state legislature nor the people
of the State of Washington could alter what the District had decided;
7
(3) the Supreme Court of the State of Washington is barred from
interpreting a provision of its state constitution as prohibiting race-
14. See iWE at 470 ('In our view, Initiative 350 must fall because it does 'not attemp[t]
to allocate governmental power on the basis of any general principle.' Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. [385,] 395, [(1969)] (Harlan, J., concurring). Instead, it uses the racial nature of
an issue to define the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus imposes substantial
and unique burdens on racial minorities." Id.).
15. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 488 (Powell, 3., dissenting).
16. See id. at488-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
17. See id. at 494 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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conscious school assignments, despite the fact that such a prohibition
would be a facially tenable construction of that provision;18
(4) The Court was contradicting the dictum in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke 9 that "in the absence of a federal constitu-
tional violation requiring race-specific remedies, a policy of strict racial
neutrality by a State would violate no federal principle."2'  Powell as-
serted:
Powell, n.14: The Court's decision intrudes deeply into normal state deci-
sionnaking. Under its holding the people of the State of
Washington apparently are forever barred from developing
a different policy on mandatory busing where a school dis-
trict previously has adopted one of its own. This principle
would not seem limited to the question of mandatory bus-
ing. Thus, if the admissions committee of a state law
school developed an affirmative-action plan that came un-
der fire, the Court apparently would find it unconstitutional
for any higher authority to intervene unless that authority
traditionally dictated admissions policies. As a constitu-
tional matter, the dean of the law school, the faculty of the
university as whole, the university president, the chancellor
of the university system, and the board of regents might be
powerless to intervene despite their greater authority under
state law. After today's decision it is unclear whether the
State may set policy in any area where a local governmental
body arguably has done "more" than the Fourteenth
Amendment requires. If local employment or benefits are
distributed on a racial basis to the benefit of racial minori-
ties, the State apparently may not thereafter ever intervene.
Indeed, under the Court's theory one must wonder
whether-under the equal protection component of the Fifth
18. See id. at 499 n.15 (Powell, J., dissenting). The provision reads: "It is the para-
mount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing
within its borders without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex."
Id. Justice Powell noted in his dissent that the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
had not interpreted this provision to prohibit race-conscious school assignments in the ab-
sence of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. But surely, Powell pointed out,
the state court could have rendered such a decision without violating the Federal Constitu-
tion. See id. at 499-500 n.15. •
19. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
20. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added) (citing Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)); cf Bakke, 438 U.S. at 379 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ('CIt may be that the Harvard plan is more acceptable
to the public than is the Davis 'quota.' If it is, any State, including California, is free to
adopt it in preference to a less acceptable alternative, just as it is generally free, as far as the
Constitution is concerned, to abjure granting any racial preferences in its admissions pro-
gram." Id). Note that the passage does not merely state that the University of California
may abjure granting any racial preferences in its admissions programs; it states that the State
of California may abjure granting preferences in the University's admissions programs.
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Amendment-even the Federal Government could assert its
superior authority to regulate in these areas.21
Significantly, the Seattle majority denied that its ruling had these im-
plications. It responded in direct reference to the parade of horribles in
Powell's footnote 14 in the following way:
Seattle, n.23: Throughout his dissent, Justice Powell insists that the Court
has created a "vested constitutional right to local decision-
making," that under our holding "the people of the State of
Washington apparently are forever barred from developing
a different policy on mandatory busing where a school dis-
trict previously had adopted one of its own," ... and that
today's decision somehow raises doubts about the "author-
ity of a State to abolish school boards altogether." ...
These statements evidence a basic misunderstanding of our
decision. Our analysis vests no rights, and has nothing to
do with whether school board action predates that taken by
the State. Instead, what we find objectionable about Initia-
tive 350 is the comparative burden it imposes on minority
participation in the political process-that is, the racial na-
ture of the way in which it structures the process of deci-
sionmaking. It is evident, then, that the horribles paraded
by the dissent.... [CI-which have nothing to do with the
ability of minorities to participate in the process of self-
government-are entirely unrelated to this case. It is
equally clear, as we have noted at several points in our
opinion, that the State remains free to vest all decision-
making power in state officials, or to remove authority from
local school boards in a race-neutral manner.23
There is no way to read this passage except as a statement that the
people of a state are not forever barred from developing a different policy
on mandatory busing where a school district previously has acted first; that
a higher governmental authority may intervene to overturn an affirmative
action plan that has been approved by the admissions committee of a law
school; that a state may set policy in an area where a local governmental
body arguably has done "more" than the Fourteenth Amendment requires.
Therefore, whatever the Seattle decision may mean, it does not support the
proposition that the people of a state are barred from constitutionalizing a
prohibition against discrimination and preferences on the basis of race, sex,
or ethnicity, as the people of California did when they adopted Proposition
209.
21. Seattle, 458 U.S. at498 n.14 (PoweU, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
22. At this point the Court cites footnote 14 of Powell's dissenting opinion in Seattle.
For the complete text of footnote 14, see supra pp. 973.
23. Seattle, 358 U.S. at 480 n.23.
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The key to interpreting Seattle is simply to distinguish between (1)
using a political decisionmaking process (such as a statewide ballot proce-
dure) to adopt a race-neutral policy at a higher level of government and (2)
explicitly altering a decisiomnaking process in a way that places a special
burden on minorities on a specifically racial question. The Court's ruling
in Seattle upholds the constitutionality of measures that fit the first de-
scription, even when the policy that has been adopted at a higher level of
government makes it more difficult for minorities to obtain legislation that
the Court might deem to be in their interest.
There must be a distinction between (1) using a political decision-
making process to adopt a race-neutral policy at a higher level of govern-
ment and (2) explicitly altering a decisionmaking process in a way that
places a special burden on minorities on a specifically racial question, for
if the phrase "explicitly alters the political decisionmaking process" is to
have any meaning, it cannot mean that a decisionmaking process is explic-
itly altered any time a higher level of government adopts a policy that pre-
cludes contrary policies at lower levels of government.
The Hunter and Reitman Precedents
Two earlier cases, Reitman v. Mulkey24 and Hunter v. Erickson,/ il-
luminate the Court's hostility to explicit alterations of the political deci-
sionmaking process with respect to racial questions.
In 1964, the city council in Akron, Ohio enacted a prohibition against
racial discrimination in real estate transactions, and established a Commis-
sion on Equal Opportunity in Housing to enforce its provisions.6 Subse-
quently, the Akron electorate amended the city charter by a citywide ballot
initiative as follows (known as Akron City Charter section 137):
ACC § 137: Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron
which regulates the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing
assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of
any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be ap-
proved by a majority of the electors voting on the question
at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall
be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the
adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until ap-
proved by the electors as provided herein.27
24. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
25. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
26. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 385-86 (1969).
27. Ia at 387 (quoting Akron City Charter § 137).
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The amendment essentially did two things. First, it repealed any ex-
isting housing ordinance regulating real estate transactions in the city on
the basis of race and the other listed factors, including the one that had re-
cently been enacted by the city council which prohibited racial discrimina-
tion in real estate transactions.28 Second, it required any future housing
ordinance bearing on a racial question to be ratified by a majority of the
city's voters in a general election.29
The amendment did not establish a right to discriminate on the basis
of race and other factors in private real estate transactions in the city of
Akron. Furthermore, in the campaign for the city charter amendment and
when defending the amendment in court, the measure's proponents and the
city of Akron never stated that they favored a policy establishing a right to
discriminate in private real estate transactions30 Rather, they defended the
measure on the grounds that any measure on this question was important
enough to be submitted to the citywide electorate 3'
Furthermore, if the citizens of Akron had adopted a policy establish-
ing a right to discriminate, such a policy would have been unconstitutional
under Reitman v. Mulkey.3 2 In Reitman, the Court struck down Proposition
14, a constitutional amendment which the people of the State of California
adopted in 1964.ss Proposition 14 provided in relevant part:
Prop. 14: Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof
shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right
of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent
any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease
or rent such property to such~erson or persons as he, in his
absolute discretion, chooses.
The question in Reitman was not whether states could discriminate on
the basis of race in real estate transactions, which they clearly could not
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The question was whether the people of
a state could constitutionalize a right to discriminate on the basis of race in
private real estate transactions. The Reitman Court held, five to four, that
Proposition 14 went beyond a position of neutrality with regard to private
discriminations3 5 The Court struck down Proposition 14 on the grounds
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 392.
31. See id. ("We are unimpressed with any of Akron's justifications for its discrimina-
tion. Characterizing it simply as a public decision to move slowly in the delicate area of
race relations emphasizes the impact and burden of § 137, but does not justify it." Id.).
32. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
33. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 369 (1967).
34. See id. at 371 (citing CAL. CoNsT. art. I § 26 (repealed 1974)).
35. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376.
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that it "encouraged" or "authorized" private discrimination and established
a right to discriminate.
36
Had Akron City Charter section 137 reserved to the residents of Ak-
ron the right to discriminate on the basis of race in their private real estate
transactions, the amendment would have been invalidated by the Court's
ruling in Reitman. Akron City Charter section 137 did not establish such a
right. Instead, it struck down the city council's prior housing ordinances
and required that all future housing ordinances bearing on race and certain
other factors be submitted to a citywide referendum.3 7 Even this measure
was struck down by the Court on the grounds that it singled out racial
matters for special treatment and altered the political decisionmaking proc-
ess in a way that placed special burdens on minority interests.38
Seattle in the Light of the Hunter and Reitman Precedents
The Court's opinion in Seattle rests squarely on its prior ruling in
Hunter. The analysis in the Seattle opinion is structured as follows: (1)
Initiative 350 is like Akron City Charter section 137 in all constitutionally
relevant respects; (2) the Hunter Court held Akron City Charter section
137 unconstitutional; therefore, (3) Initiative 350 is unconstitutional. 39 To
36. See id.
37. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389-90.
38. See id. at 392-93. In Reitman, the Court held that while it would be permissible for
the people of a state to repeal all existing fair housing laws, the people of a state could not
amend their constitution to establish a right to discriminate on the basis of race in private
real estate transactions. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 380-81. There is no constitutionally rele-
vant point in common between the measure held unconstitutional in Reitman and Proposi-
tion 209, which contains a stronger prohibition against racial discrimination and preferences
than anything that is presently found in either the Federal Constitution or the Constitution of
the State of California. The ban against racial discrimination in Proposition 209 is aper se
rule. Existing state and federal bans against racial discrimination fall short of this. Conse-
quently, it cannot be argued that in going beyond a "mere repeal" of laws and measures
permitting racial preferences, Proposition 209 runs afoul of the Court's ruling in Reitman.
For Proposition 209 to run afoul of that ruling, it would have to be shown that Proposition
209's per se ban against racial discrimination is itself discriminatory.
39. Compare the following passages from Seattle which cite Hunter (1) "In the end,
appellants are reduced to suggesting that Hunter has been effectively overruled by more re-
cent decisions of this Court." Seattle, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982); and (2) "For present pur-
poses, it is enough that minorities may consider busing for integration to be 'legislation that
is in their interest'.... Given the racial focus of Initiative 350, this suffices to trigger ap-
plication of the Hunter doctrine.' ... We are also satisfied that the practical effect of Initia-
tive 350 is to work a reallocation of power of the kind condemned in Hunter... As in
Hunter, then, the community's political mechanisms are modified to place effective deci-
sionmaking authority over a racial issue at a different level of government." Seattle, 458
U.S. at 474 (citation omitted). "Appellants' suggestion that this analysis somehow conflicts
with Hunter, however, misapprehends the basis of the Hunter doctrine." Id. at 485.
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understand Seattle, therefore, it is essential to understand why the Court
felt that Initiative 350 presented exactly the same constitutional issue that
the Akron city charter amendment presented in Hunter.
Without taking a position on racial discrimination in private real es-
tate transactions (Akron City Charter section 137) or the merits of manda-
tory racial busing (Initiative 350), the electorate in these two ballot mea-
sures explicitly altered the established political decisionmaking structure
and placed decisionmaking power over a racial issue at a higher level of
government. Both measures were deemed by the Court to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court did not say in either case--and in Se-
attle explicitly denied-that states have no power to establish a race-
neutral policy on a racial question that makes it more difficult for minori-
ties to obtain legislation the Court might deem to be in their interest. We
have also seen that there are a priori reasons for not interpreting the phrase
"explicitly alters the political decisionmaking structure" so broadly that it
covers policies enacted at higher levels of government that preempt con-
trary policies at subordinate levels of government.
The following principle summarizes the foregoing points regarding
the Hunter doctrine (hereinafter "HD"),4°
HD: A measure that addresses a racial question, and which ex-
plicitly and directly alters the political decisionmaking
structure on that question in a way that places special bur-
dens on racial minorities, offends the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Measures that offend the Fourteenth Amendment in
this way include, but are not limited to, explicit alterations
in the political decisionmaking structure that place deci-
sionmaking authority over a specifically racial question at a
higher and more remote level of government.
The following principle HD' focuses on what the Hunter doctrine does not
prohibit:
HD': A policy measure that is adopted at a higher level of gov-
ernment through the use of an existing decisionmaking
structure does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even
if such a measure makes it more difficult for minorities to
obtain legislation that the Court might deem to be in their
Referring to both Hunter and Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), the
Seattle Court stated: "We believe that the Court of Appeals properly focused on Hunter and
Lee, for we find the principle of those cases dispositive of the issue here. In our view, ii-
tiative 350 must fall because it does 'not attemptQ] to allocate governmental power on the
basis of any general principle.' . .. Instead, it uses the racial nature of an issue to define
the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus imposes substantial and unique bur-
dens on racial minorities." Id. at 470.
40. The Hunter Doctrine ("l-D") is the author's formulation of the doctrine enunciated
in the Hunter trilogy, namely, Hunter, 393 U.S. 385, Seattle, 458 U.S. 457, and Crawford,
458 U.S. 527.
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interest (provided, of course, that the measure itself is con-
stitutionally permissible in all other respects). When a
higher level of government adopts such a measure, it is not
altering the political decisionmaking structure in a way that
violates the Hunter doctrine, but is simply exerting the
power which it inherently has to establish any policies, in- -
cluding those bearing on specifically racial questions, that
are not prohibited by the Federal Constitution.
Much if not most of the controversy between the majority and the dis-
senting justices in Seattle was over the question of whether Initiative 350
violated the Hunter doctrine.4! Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
said that it violated the Hunter doctrine;42 Justice Powell, writing for the
minority, said that it did not.43 On this particular point, Blackmun was cor-
rect, and Powell was incorrect. For example, the Court had no difficulty in
showing that decisionmaking authority over school busing had been
placed, at least as a matter of practice, in local school boards before the
adoption of Initiative 350." Given this fact, Initiative 350 violated the
Hunter doctrine as formulated in HD above, for it explicitly denied local
school boards decisionmaking authority over a racial question which
school boards had previously held.45 It was also a non sequitur for Justice
Powell to suggest that the Court's holding in Seattle established that
henceforth no state would be allowed to develop "a different policy on
mandatory busing where a school district previously had adopted one of its
own,"46 for the people of the state of Washington did not, by adopting Ini-
tiative 350, establish a policy on racial busing, nor did the Court's analysis
imply that it had.
Nevertheless, there is one crucial difference between Initiative 350
and Akron City Charter Amendment section 137, and Powell was quite
right to draw attention to it. What clearly concerned the Court in Hunter
was the thought that with Akron City Charter section 137 the citizens of
Akron had achieved by indirect means what the people of the state of Cali-
fornia had tried to achieve directly with Proposition 14. This outcome
would be a legitimate concern for the Court, since it had already held
Proposition 14 unconstitutional in Reitmanf But the situation was quite
different in Seattle, for the Court had never held (and has not held since)
41. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42. See id at 470.
43. See id. at 498 (Powell, I., dissenting).
44. See id. at 478.
45. See id. at 480.
46. Id. at498.
47. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376.
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that a prohibition against racial busing for the purposes of remedying de
facto segregation is per se a violation of the Constitution.
As important as this distinction is, however, it is not one that either
requires or recommends amending HD. First, such an amendment would
be required only if HD immunized race-conscious measures at lower levels
of government against race-neutral measures at higher levels of govern-
ment. HD does not have this effect, for it does not apply to substantive
policy enactments at all.
Second, amending HD would fail to capture the distinction because
the distinction is essentially substantive rather than procedural. Consider,
for example, the following proposal HDR, which amends HD to prohibit
measures like Akron City Charter section 137, while permitting measures
like Initiative 350:
HDR: A political body may repeal existing legislation on a spe-
cifically racial question and alter the political decision-
making process on that question, if and only if it would be
constitutionally permissible for that body to enact at the
same time a permanent prohibition against the legislation
that it repeals.
Since Initiative 350 did not repeal any existing antidiscrimination
legislation, the amended rule would exempt Initiative 350 while barring
Akron City Charter section 137, which repealed a fair housing ordinance.
The amended rule is not satisfactory as it stands, however, since it would
not cover explicit alterations in the political decisionmaking process that
are purely prospective, i.e., that do not repeal any existing antidiscrimina-
tipn laws, but simply make it more difficult for minorities to enact antici-
pated legislation of that kind in the future.
There are additional problems. Suppose that the people of a state
adopt a ballot measure that removes authority to order racial busing from
local school boards and, in addition, imposes a supermajority requirement
for the enactment of mandatory racial busing measures, whether by the
state legislature or by statewide initiative. Such a measure would satisfy
the proposed amended rule-because a policy prohibiting racial busing is
not itself unconstitutional-but would surely be struck down by the Court,
for placing a supermajority requirement on the enactment of racial legisla-
tion, and only such legislation, is precisely the kind of alteration of the po-
litical decisionmaking process that the Court regarded as unconstitutional
in Hunter.48 Such measures are suspect as a class, including those that,
48. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 486-87 ("Certainly, a state requirement that 'desegregation
or antidiscrimination laws,'... and only such laws, be passed by unanimous vote of the
legislature would be constitutionally suspect. It would be equally questionable for a com-
munity to require that laws or ordinances 'designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect
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like Initiative 350, only involve moving decisionmaking authority over
such matters to a higher level of government.
The Seattle Court applied HD to Initiative 350 and found it wanting,
while stating that a measure embodying the policy choice that Initiative
350 left to the discretion of the state legislature (i.e., a neighborhood
school policy, or a ban on racial busing to remedy de facto segregation)
would have been constitutional 9 At first sight, the ruling may seem per-
verse, but it is not. It is perfectly reasonable to find in the Federal Consti-
tution a prohibition against explicit alterations of the decisionmaking proc-
ess on specifically racial issues that have the effect of diminishing the
political power of racial minorities on those issues. But, as Powell argued,
and the Court agreed, it is absurd to suggest that race-conscious measures
enacted by lower levels of government (including those that arguably bene-
fit minorities) have constitutional protection against contrary policies at
higher levels of government. Seattle turns out to be an unusually nuanced
and subtle decision that does justice to both truths.
Amar and Caminker on the Procedure-Substance Distinction
Amar and Caminker acknowledge that drawing a distinction between
the use of an existing political decisionmaking process to enact a racial
policy change at a higher level of government, on the one hand, and ex-
plicitly altering that decisionmaking process on the other, offers an initially
plausible, primafacie basis for interpreting Seattle° They contend, how-
racial minorities' ... be confirmed by popular vote of the electorate as a whole, while com-
parable legislation is exempted from a similar procedure." Id.).
49. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 487.
50. See Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1045-46.
Some might try to invoke a procedure-substance distinction in an effort to separate the
CCRI from the initiatives found wanting in Hunter and Seattle. In both of those cases,
the Court's language repeatedly characterized the initiatives at issue as having "re-
structured" the pre-existing political process to impose burdens that are "racial in char-
acter."... This repeated emphasis at least raises the possibility that such explicit re-
structuring is conceived by the Court to be an integral part of the unconstitutional
burden driving the Hunter doctrine. In other words, one might argue, the Hunter doc-
trine prohibits states from enacting initiatives that on their face directly restructure the
pre-existing political process in a manner that is "racial in character," but does not
similarly prohibit states from enacting initiatives that on their face merely "work a sim-
ple change in policy," even if they incidentally entrench the new policy.
We acknowledge that such a purported procedure-substance distinction might at
first blush provide a plausible defense of the CCRI. After all, on its face the CCRI
looks more like a mere change of policy rather than a direct attempt to reallocate politi-
cal power within the state. Unlike the Akron charter amendment and Initiative 350, the
CCRI does not directly declare that it is withdrawing political authority from one gov-
ernment level and vesting it solely in a higher one (i.e., the constitutional amendment
process).
See Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1045-46 (citations omitted).
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ever, that there is evidence within the Seattle opinion that the Court re-
garded the substance-procedure distinction as vague and unimportant 5 '
But the passage from Seattle that they cite in support of this assertion,
which is given below, is not on point:
Justice Powell finds Hunter completely irrelevant, dismissing it with the
conclusory statement that "the political system has not been redrawn or
altered." ... The evil condemned by the Hunter Court was not the
particular political obstacle of mandatory referenda imposed by the Ak-.
ron charter amendment; it was, rather, the comparative structural burden
placed on the political achievement of minority interests. Thus, in
Hunter, the procedures for enacting racial legislation were modified in
such a way as to place effective control in the hands of the citywide
electorate. Similarly here, the power to enact racial legislation has been
reallocated. In each case, the effect of the challenged action was to re-
draw decisionmaking authority over racial matters-and only over racial
matters-in such a way as to place comparative burdens on minorities.
While Justice Powell and the United States find it crucial that the pro-
ponents of integrated schools remain free to use Washington's initiative
system to further their ends, that was true in Hunter as well: proponents
of open housing were not barred from invoking Akron's initiative pro-
cedures to repeal the charter amendment, or to enact fair housing legis-
lation of their own. It is surely an excessive formal exercise, then, to ar-
gue that the procedural revisions at issue in Hunter imposed special
burdens on minorities, but that the selective allocation of decisionmak-
ing authority worked by Initiative 350 does not erect comparable politi-
cal obstacles. Indeed, Hunter would have been virtually identical to this
case had the Akron city charter amendment simply barred the City
Council from passing any fair housing ordinance, as Initiative 350 for-
bids the use of all mandatory desegregation strategies. Surely, however,
Hunter would not have come out the other way had the charter amend-
ment made no provision for the passage of fair housing legislation, in-
stead of subjecting such legislation to ratification by referendum.
52
It is difficult to understand why Amar and Caminker regard this pas-
sage as evidence that the Seattle Court regarded the procedure-substance
distinction as constitutionally unimportant. The point of the passage is to
show that, contra Justice Powell, Initiative 350 was exactly like Akron City
Charter section 137 in all constitutionally relevant respects-and as we
have seen, Initiative 350 and the Akron City Charter Amendment were
51. See id. at 1047.
52. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474-75 n.17, cited in Amar and Caminker, supra note 3, at
1047-48 (adducing the passage as evidence that the Seattle Court "explicitly rejected a
bright-line distinction between procedural and substantive changes." Amar & Caminker,
supra note 3, at 1048.). Although Amar and Caninker opine that this rejection is "consis-
tent with the Court's general concern for real-world effects and its rejection of formalism,"
they fail to mention footnote 23 of the Seattle decision in this connection. There is no plau-
sible way of interpreting that footnote except as an acknowledgment by the Court that this
distinction is a constitutionally important one. See supra pp. 972-75; infra pp. 985-90.
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procedural changes in the political decisionmaking process, rather than
substantive policy enactments.
The passage responds directly to Powell's assertion (1) that "nothing
in Hunter supports the Court's extraordinary invasion into the State's dis-
tribution of authority," (2) that "in this case, unlike in Hunter, the political
system has not been redrawn or altered," and (3) that "Hunter, therefore, is
simply irrelevant.:53 Blackmun had no difficulty showing that these asser-
tions are mistaken. He began by pointing out that Initiative 350 worked its
changes precisely by altering the existing political decisionmaking struc-
ture.54 Before the adoption of Initiative 350, decisions about racial busing
were made by local school boards in the State of Washington.s5 After the
adoption of Initiative 350, local school boards no longer had this power5 6
Likewise, in Hunter, Blackmun said, "the procedures for enacting racial
legislation were modified in such a way as to place effective control in the
53. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 497-98 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell also asserts in this
connection that:
[TMhe State's political system is not altered when it adopts for the first time a pol-
icy, concededly within the area of its authority, for the regulation of local school
districts. And certainly racial minorities are not uniquely or comparatively bur-
dened by the State's adoption of a policy that would be lawful if adopted by any
school district in the State.
Id. at 497-98. Taken in context, this implies that Initiative 350 was such a policy. This is
an error, however, and a serious one that infects Powell's critique generally. The Court it-
self never made this mistake. As previously mentioned, the Court noted that Initiative 350
left the state legislature free to order racial busing. See id. at 474. A referendum adopted by
the people of a state that leaves its state legislature free to order racial busing, and that
would remain entirely unmodified by any future referendum that ordered such busing, most
emphatically does not constitute the adoption of an anti-busing policy by the people of that
state.
The above passage was a response to Powel's claim that Initiative 350 did not redraw
or alter the political system in Washington State, rather than a response to Powell's implied
assertion that Initiative 350 represented a policy on racial busing. See id. at 491-93. There
is, therefore, absolutely no reason to interpret the last sentence of the quoted paragraph as
Amar and Caminker do. They say: "We can restate this final sentence to focus on a state
constitution rather than a city charter as follows: A substantive state constitutional amend-
ment prohibiting all racial preferences would be treated the same under the Equal Protection
Clause as would a procedural state constitutional amendment submitting all statutes grant-
ing racial preferences to ratification by referendum (which would clearly be unconstitutional
under Hunter)." Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1048. Nothing in the cited passage
even remotely suggests this reading. Furthermore, the suggested reading is irreconcilable
with what the Seattle Court statedregarding the impact of its ruling on policy enactments.
See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 480 n.23.
54. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474.
55. See id. at 477-79.
56. See id at 480.
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hands of the citywide electorate." 57 The effect in each case, he added, is to
"redraw decisionnaking authority over racial matters."
58
It was also easy for Blackmun to dispense with Powell's claim that
Initiative 350 differed constitutionally from Akron City Charter section
137 on the grounds that proponents of mandatory racial busing in Wash-
ington State could use the initiative process to overturn Initiative 350 and
obtain race-conscious legislation they deemed to be in their interest.59
Blackmun pointed out that this failed to distinguish Initiative 350 from the
Akron city charter amendment, because the same was true of minority citi-
zens seeking fair housing legislation after the adoption of Akron City
Charter section 137.6°
Indeed, if one ignores the fact (as Blackmun did in the above passage)
that Initiative 350 left the state legislature free to order mandatory racial
busing and focuses solely on Initiative 350's effect on local school boards,
Initiative 350 made it even more difficult for minorities to obtain legisla-
tion that was arguably in their interest than was the case with Akron City
Charter section 137. Akron City Charter section 137 established a two-
step decisionmaking structure with respect to housing ordinances involving
racial issues.61 It left the city council with the power to draft and propose
housing ordinances involving racial questions but left decisionmaking
authority over such measures with the citywide electorate, which either
adopted them or rejected them by majority vote62 For a precise analogy
between the Akron city charter provision and Initiative 350, one would
have to suppose that section 137 had removed even the drafting and pro-
posing powers from the city council, just as Initiative 350 had completely
removed all power over racial busing from the local school boards. As
Blackmun pointed out, this removal of powers would have made section
137 even more vulnerable to attack under the Hunter doctrine, as it would
have left the city council with no authority over such matters.
65
Since neither Initiative 350 nor Akron City Charter section 137 in-
volved a substantive policy enactment on a racial question, the passage
cited by Amar and Caminker cannot be taken as in any way undermining
the procedure-substance distinction. The passage is limited to the argu-
ment that no matter how it is viewed, Initiative 350 is exactly like Akron




61. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387.
62. See id. Alternatively, citizens could place such measures on the citywide ballot di-
rectly by gathering petition signatures from 10 percent of the citywide electorate.
63. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474 n.14.
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City Charter section 137 in all relevant respects under the Hunter doctrine,
which is concerned solely with explicit alterations in the political deci-
sionmaking process on racial questions.
Amar and Caminker on Washington v. Seattle School
District No. 1
As we have seen, Initiative 350 was not a substantive policy enact-
ment that extended the right of the people of the State of Washington to be
free of racial classifications.6 Rather, it was an explicit alteration of the
political decisionmaking process on a specifically racial question, and only
that. Despite this fact, Amar and Caminker contend that Seattle also stands
for the proposition that a measure like Proposition 209, which is a sub-
stantive, race-neutral policy enactment, is unconstitutional as well.65
Unaccountably, however, Amar and Caminker never once mention
that the Seattle Court, in footnote 23, specifically denied that its ruling
precluded a state from adopting a different policy on mandatory busing
where a school district previously had adopted one of its own. 6 In fact,
the following passage is the only explicit reference that Amar and
Caminker make to footnote 23: "Mhe State remains free to vest all deci-
sionnaslng power in state officials, or to remove authority from local
school boards in a race-neutral manner.... [W]hat we find objectionable
about Initiative 350 is the comparative burden it imposes on minority par-
ticipation in the political process .... '67
Amar and Caminker failed to address the Court's explicit denial of
Powell's horribles in footnote 23, including its denial of Powell's allega-
tion that "the people of the State of Washington apparently are forever
barred from developing a different policy on mandatory busing where a
64. See supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
65. See Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1021. Amar and Caminker state that:
The CCRI singles out race and treats it differently from any other criterion for
public employment, education, and contracting decisions. In doing so, the CCRI
isolates an issue of special interest to minorities-affirmative action programs ...
-and relegates this issue to the highest and most entrenched level of governmen-
tal decisionmaking. This would seem to violate the Equal Protection Clause as
interpreted by the Court in the Hunter trilogy. See Hunter v. Erickson 393 U.S.
385 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Craw-
ford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982)." Il
66. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 480 n.23.
67. Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1045 n.85 (Emphasis added). This citation re-
verses the order of the two sentences in the cited passage, and also omits the phrase "that is,
the racial nature of the way in which it structures the process of decisionmaking" from the
sentence that begins "[What we find objectionable about Initiative 350 ...." See Seattle,
458 U.S. at 480 n.23. For the complete text of footnote 23, see supra p. 974.
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school district previously has adopted one of its own." 6  Consequently,
Amar and Caminker never directly address the problem that this explicit
denial presents to their interpretation of Seattle.6 9 In their view, the fact
that the people of a state can adopt a different policy on mandatory busing
where a school district previously has acted means that they may do so, but
only if they develop a policy on every other matter involving school trans-
portation and school assignments, whether racial or non-racial. They state,
for example:
In both [Hunter and Seattle], the Court reaffirmed that a state or city
may freely remove political authority generally from lower to higher
levels within the intrastate governmental hierarchy. But a state may not
so remove political authority in a manner that is 'racial in character'-
even (as in Hunter) where that removal is back to the people them-
selves-because such a move might entrench the antiminority policy
and thus preclude equal participation in political decisionmaking....
... [WIhen the people of a state want to entrench a substantive norm at
a centralized level (such as the state constitution) and the norm will be
detrimental to the interests of racial minorities, the people must take
care to define the norm in a sufficiently general way-to avoid the im-
pression of a gerrymander, if you will-such that the norm is not "racial
in character"... [IThe CCRI is problematic because it singles out race
for unique treatment-no other education, employment, or contracting
criterion is removed from consideration by lower levels of govern-
ment-just as Initiative 350 treated race unlike any other criterion in
busing decisions.
70
Amar and Caminker's interpretation of footnote 23 of the Court's
opinion must be rejected for several reasons. First, it must be rejected as a
purely linguistic matter. If X is asked whether Y has the authority to adopt
a policy on a particular subject-matter that preempts contrary policies by
lower levels of government, and X replies that Y does have such authority,
it would be unnatural to interpret that affirmative answer to mean that Y
may do so if, but only if Y also reserves decisionmaking authority on all
other matters. According to Amar and Caminker, however, a state may
preempt race-conscious policies of a certain kind by lower levels of gov-
ernment only by adopting policies that sweep so broadly that they are not
68. Seattle, 458 U.S. at498 n.14 (Powell, ., dissenting).
69. There can be no doubt that the reference in footnote 23 to "mandatory busing" was
to mandatory racial busing in particular. Footnote 23 is a response to Powell's parade of
horribles, and Powell announces at the outset of his dissent that he uses the term "manda-
tory busing" to refer to busing or mandatory student assignments for the purpose of achiev-
ing racial integration. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 488 n.l.
70. Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1044, 1053.
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racial in character at all. This is not a plausible reading of the statement in
question.
Second, Amar and Caminker's interpretation of the crucial statements
in footnote 23 can be taken seriously only if the condition that it lays down
could be met in the real world-and it obviously could not be met. While
it might be possible for the people of a state to adopt a statewide measure
that deals with the full range of policy choices which might arise in a very
restricted domain, they clearly could not do so for a more broad range of
government action. This problem applies to Proposition 209, which
sweeps very widely, prohibiting discrimination and preferences against any
individual or group in three broad areas of governmental action.
It is not clear from the Amar-Caminker analysis of Seattle how Initia-
tive 350 could be amended to pass constitutional muster. Initiative 350
purported to be a prohibition against school busing, but included so many
exceptions that its sole practical effect was to prohibit racial busing. How
many of Initiative 350's exceptions would have to be removed in order for
it to be exempt from the charge of being specifically "racial in character?"
Furthermore, if the drafters had wanted to drop some but not all of the ex-
ceptions, what criterion could have been used to make the selection? Any
truncated list would almost certainly be arbitrary; as a practical matter, the
drafters would have been forced to drop all the exceptions. The drafters
would have been forced to present the voters with a measure that prohib-
ited busing for any reason-including busing which is required when a
student requires special education, or when there are health or safety haz-
ards between the student's residence and the nearest or next nearest school,
or when the nearby schools are overcrowded, unsafe, or lacking in physical
facilities.7' This poison pill would render any proposal to prohibit racial
busing so unattractive that it could never be taken seriously.
Similar questions arise when applying the Amar-Caminker analysis of
footnote 23 to Proposition 209. Discrimination and preferential treatment
under a given criterion X occurs whenever two or more individuals or
groups are treated differently on the basis of X. To conform with the
Amar-Caminker analysis of footnote 23 of the Seattle opinion, therefore,
Proposition 209 would either have to prohibit all preferences and discrimi-
natory treatment in the three areas of governmental action that it covers, or
it would have to state clearly, for each and every way in which individuals
or groups could be treated differently in these areas of governmental ac-
tion, whether that kind of discriminatory and preferential treatment is or is
not permissible.
71. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 489 (Powell, J., dissenting), where Justice Powel mentions
that these exceptions were permitted by Initiative 350.
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The first suggestion could not be taken seriously, for by its very na-
ture, governmental action classifies and draws distinctions among indi-
viduals and groups; consequently, an unqualified prohibition of discrimi-
nation and preferences in the three areas of governmental action covered
by Proposition 209 would effectively bar the State of California from leg-
islating in these three areas altogether. The other option would be equally
unacceptable. As a purely practical matter, the people of a state could not,
for example, decide in their constitution all questions about overtime,
compensation, pension plans, occupational safety standards, and all other
matters involving public employment. Similar problems would arise in the
other two areas of state action. In the case of university admissions, for
example, a universal prohibition against discrimination and preferences
under any criterion would necessarily impose on a state an unqualified
open admissions policy. But the only alternative to such a policy under the
Amar-Caminker interpretation of Seattle would be to have the state con-
stitution provide decision rules for university admission so comprehensive
and so detailed that they would leave no discretion to university officials.
,Such micromanagement by government would clearly not be feasible and
would be highly undesirable even if it were feasible.!
2
Nor could Amar and Caminker evade the force of the foregoing ob-
jections by arguing that their analysis requires only that a measure like 209
sweep broadly enough to prohibit all forms of discrimination and prefer-
72. The difference between the interpretation of footnote 23 that is advocated in this
paper and the one provided (at least elliptically and implicitly) by Amar and Caminker can
be summarized as follows. On the interpretation that is advocated here, the assertion in
footnote 23 that the people of a state are permitted to adopt a policy prohibiting race-
conscious action even when a local school board has acted first means exactly what it says.
According to Amar and Caminker, however, it means that the people of a state may do so,
but only if they also accept responsibility for setting policy on every other conceivable mat-
ter. But the assertion that the people of a state may establish a race-neutral policy even
when a subordinate jurisdiction has enacted a race-conscious policy first is in conflict with
the claim that the people of a state may do so only if they reserve all policy-making respon-
sibilities to themselves, for this condition could never be met in the real world.
The problem is not with the rule laid down in Seattle that an explicit alteration of the
political decisionmaking structure on a specifically racial question that disadvantages racial
minorities is unconstitutional. According to that principle, explicit changes in a state's po-
litical decisionmaking structure cannot be specifically directed to a racial question, but must
apply generally. Such a constitutional principle is workable and does not lead to the result
that race-conscious measures by subordinate entities preempt race-neutral policies by higher
governmental entities, unless higher governmental entities are also prohibited from adopting
preemptive race-neutral policies. It is the combination of Seattle's constitutional doctrine
prohibiting procedural changes of a certain kind and the Amar-Caminker assertion that a
pure policy enactment like Proposition 209 is also unconstitutional that effectively deprives
the state of any viable means of preempting race-conscious measures enacted at lower levels
of government. According to the Court's explicit statement in footnote 23, however, such
policies can be preempted.
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ential treatment that do not involve merit. This proposal does not work be-
cause there is no workable definition or understanding of merit. Indeed,
civil rights measures like the United States Civil Rights Act or California's
Proposition 209 do not attempt to define what merit is. They simply assert
that however merit may be defined and whatever it may include, it cannot
and should not include race.
73
The Amar-Caminker interpretation of footnote 23 must be rejected for
a third reason. The Court has subjected explicit changes in the political
decisionmaking process bearing on specifically racial questions to strict
scrutiny.74 This is because, in the case of substantive policy enactments on
racial questions, everything is "on the table." But it is otherwise in the
case of explicit alterations in the political decisionmaking process. In the
latter, the concern is not so much with what such alterations do directly, as
with how they can affect the political outcome of future measures that are
placed before the electorate, including those designed to protect minorities
against discrimination. The purpose of the Hunter doctrine is to protect
minorities against alterations of the political process which, although they
elude conventional constitutional analysis, nevertheless prejudice the in-
terests of minorities.75
73. See Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition 209, in California Ballot Pamphlet,
General Election November 5, 1996. One of the most common objections to 209, both be-
fore and after election day, has been that it singles out race and sex for special treatment.
This objection is confused, for it is precisely this feature that distinguishes civil rights leg-
islation from other kinds of legislation. Future civil rights legislation and case law may in-
clude prohibitions against discrimination and special treatment under criteria that are not
presently regarded by the law or public opinion as civil rights issues, but it is silly to argue
that 209 is invalid because it includes only the criteria of race, sex, color, ethnicity, and na-
tional origin.
Significantly, those who have criticized CCRI on this score have never provided a
comprehensive, closed list of additional criteria that either could or should have been used
instead. This is hardly surprising, given the inherent difficulties in providing such a list.
Should the government extend civil rights protections to beet farmers, thereby making it
impossible for the government to grant subsidies to artichok farmers but not to them?
Should civil rights laws be extended to protect poor or rich people, veterans or non-
veterans, urban or rural residents (to name only a few possible categories) against unfavor-
able or less favorable treatment by government? The point is that critics cannot condemn
measures like 209 for its "specifically racial character" without providing a larger, closed,
comprehensive list of criteria that is not specifically racial but which nevertheless provides a
rational basis for governmental action. It is virtually certain that no consensus could emerge
about such a list.
74. See supra pp. 972-75.
75. See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 546 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("The Court always has recognized that distortions of the political process have
special implications for attempts to achieve equal protection of the laws. Thus the Court has
found particularly pernicious those classifications that threaten the ability of minorities to
involve themselves in the process of self-government, for if laws are not drawn within a
'just framework,' .. it is unlikely that they will be drawn on just principles" Id. at 546.).
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This protection was the underlying concern of the Court in Seattle. It
is true that racial busing to cure de facto segregation is not constitutionally
required. But Initiative 350 did significantly alter the political decision-
making process on a specifically racial question (indeed, that is all it did),
and the Court found this alteration sufficiently suspect under the Hunter
doctrine to strike down the measure, rather than distinguish it. The Court's
decision was defensible, because alterations of the political structure on
specifically racial questions are generally suspect.
It is this concern regarding the protection of minorities against altera-
tions of the political process which prejudice their interests that explains
the Court's emphasis in footnote 23 of the Seattle opinion on the way that
Initiative 350 structured the process of decisionmaldng on a specifically
racial question. The only plausible way of interpreting the Court's empha-
sis on this point is to assume that the Court was drawing attention to the
very procedure-substance distinction that Amar and Caminker ask us to
dismiss. That is, footnote 23 must be read as dismissing Powell's parade
of horribles on the grounds that, while its ruling did prohibit measures (like
Initiative 350) that explicitly alter the political decisionmaking process, its
ruling did not prohibit policies that would preempt race-conscious meas-
ures by local school boards.
Powell's fundamental objection was that the Court's ruling in Seattle
threatened to immunize race-conscious enactments by lower levels of gov-
ernment against race-neutral enactments by higher levels of government.
7 6
Powell regarded this supposed implication as patently absurd, which it is.
Footnote 23 can be read only as an answer to the whole parade of horribles
in Powell's dissenting opinion and this implication in particular. On the
Amar-Caminker reading, however, footnote 23 cannot be read as an answer
to what Powell clearly regarded as the most serious and obvious horrible of
all. Indeed, on Amar and Caminker's reading, footnote 23 actually en-
dorses it.
Initiative 350 did not establish a neighborhood school or anti-busing
policy for the State of Washington, nor did it alter in any way the regime of
rights under the State's Constitution.7 However, on the same day that the
Court handed down its decision in Seattle, it also handed down its decision
in Crawford, which concerned a ballot measure adopted by the people of
California which did directly alter California's constitutional scheme with
respect to pupil school assignment and pupil transportation, including
school assignments based on race and mandatory racial busing. 8 Craw-
76. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 489 (Powell, J., dissenting).
77. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 457.
78. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 546.
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ford, therefore, is a particularly important precedent for the constitutional
analysis of Proposition 209. What the Court did in Crawford provides
strong evidence for the constitutionality of 209, and important additional
evidence against the Amar-Caminker interpretation of Seattle.
Crawford v. Board of Education79
Prior to Proposition I, a statewide constitutional amendment by refer-
endum that was adopted by the California electorate in 1970, California
courts could order racial busing even when they would have had no
authority to do so under the Federal Constitution. 80 These court orders had
been based on the state constitution's equal protection clause, which the
courts had interpreted as requiring the state to remedy defacto as well as
dejure segregation in the public schools.
81
Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to Article I, Section 7(a) of the
California Constitution to prohibit such court-ordered busing. This section
of the state constitution now provides in relevant part:
Prop. I: (a)[1] A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or denied equal pro-
tection of the laws; [2] provided, that nothing contained
herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the
State of California or any public entity, board, or official
any obligations or responsibilities which exceed those im-
posed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution with respect to the
use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. [3]
In enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this
Constitution, no court of this state may impose upon the
State of California or any public entity, board or official
any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of
pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except
to remedy a specific violation by such party that would also
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2)
unless a federal court would be permitted under federal de-
cisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon
such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
79. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
80. Seeid at530.
81. See id.
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[41 Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a
school district from voluntarily continuing or commencing
a school integration elan after the effective date of this sub-
division as amended. 
2
In Crawford, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Proposition I,
eight to one. If one looked only at Proposition I(a)[3] above, this might
seem surprising because phrase [3] has much the same form as Initiative
350, which the Court struck down on the same day. Prop. I (a)[3] says
"[N]o court of this state may impose... ," just as Initiative 350 said, in ef-
fect, "No local school board etc. shall order ... ." But phrase [3] cannot
.e considered in isolation, for it is in fact a mere corollary of phrase [2].
Before the adoption of Proposition I, state courts had interpreted the
equal protection clause of the state constitution as requiring the State of
California to take race-conscious measures that went beyond anything re-
quired by the Federal Constitution. Proposition I repealed that interpreta-
tion of the State Constitution and brought the California Constitution into
conformity with the Federal Constitution on this particul&tr question in
every respect. Consequently, state courts could not enforce non-federally-
required racial busing after the adoption of Proposition I, because the cor-
responding right on which such court-ordered busing had been based had
been repealed. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, offered the
following analysis in his concurring opinion in Crawford:
State courts do not create the rights they enforce; those rights originate
elsewhere-in the state legislature, in the state's political subdivisions,
or in the state constitution itself. When one of those rights is repealed,
and therefore is rendered unenforceable in the courts, that action hardly
can be said to restructure the state's decisionmaking mechanism. While
the California electorate may have made it more difficult to achieve de-
segregation when it enacted Proposition I, to my mind it did so not by
working a structural change in the political process so much as by sim-
ply repealing the right to invoke a judicial busing remedy ... 83
The implication for Proposition 209 is clear. Since the Federal Con-
stitution does not require racial busing as a cure for de facto segregation,
the people of a state may repeal any provision in their state constitution
that requires such busing. By the same reasoning, the people of a state
may amend their state constitution to abolish all discrimination and prefer-
ential treatment based on race, since the Federal Constitution does not re-
quire-indeed, barely tolerates-racial preferences. Neither Proposition I
82. CAL. CONST. arL I, § 7(a). In citing this section of the California state Constitution,
the square brackets "[1]", "[2]", "[3]", and "[4]" have been inserted to facilitate references
to particular phrases in the following exposition. Before the adoption of Proposition I, Arti-
cle I, Section 7(a) included only (a)[1]; (a)[2]-(a)[4] were added to it by Proposition L
83. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 546 (Blackmun, L, concurring).
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nor Proposition 209 suffers from the constitutional infirmity of Initiative
350, for they are both substantive policy enactments rather than explicit
alterations in the state's decisionmaking process. Since Proposition I was
held to be constitutional by the Court, Proposition 209 is constitutional as
well.
It is not surprising that Amar and Caminker see Crawford as a threat
to their interpretation of the Hunter doctrine and to their claim that CCRI
is unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent. They attempt to meet
this threat by arguing that the Crawford Court implicitly held that, whereas
a state may create a right on the part of its citizens to be free of court-
ordered racial busing that is predicated on their state constitution, a state is
barred from creating a right on the part of its citizens to be free of racial
busing when it is ordered by a local school board.M Since Proposition I did
not limit the discretion of lower levels of government in California to order
racial busing, they argue, it was a "mere repeal."85 Had it not been a mere
repeal, we are asked to believe, the Crawford Court would have struck it
down:
Superficially, Crawford seems to establish some limiting principle to the
reach of the Hunter doctrine, one that might appear to save the CCRI
because it, like Proposition I, is a constitutional amendment that is (ar-
guably) packaged as a substantive policy change rather than an altera-
tion of political process. On closer examination, however, Crawford
represents an unexceptional application of the 'mere repeal' rule.
Proposition I simply worked a repeal, by the enacting entity of a sub-
stantive constitutional norm favorable to racial minorities. It did not, by
word or effect, withdraw pre-existing or future political authority from
lower levels of governmen.!
6
It is true that the Crawford Court mentions the power which Proposi-.
tion I left with local school boards as a feature of the measure that distin-
guished it from Initiative 350. But it is an error to maintain, as Amar and
Caminker do,88 that the Crawford Court somehow implied that if Proposi-
tion I had not been distinguishable from Initiative 350 on this score, it
would have been deemed unconstitutional. A close reading of the text
shows that the opposite is the case. It is perfectly clear from the Crawford
opinion that the Court would have upheld the constitutionality of Proposi-
tion I even if the measure had withdrawn the power to order racial busing
and racial school assignments from local school boards.
84. Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1052.
85. Id. at 1049-50.
86. Id.
87. Cf Seattle, 458 U.S. at 535-36 n.12.
88. See Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1049-52.
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The principal reason is that the Court regarded the power that school
boards retained under Proposition I as a feature of the measure that went
beyond anything required by the Federal Constitution.89 It follows that
this power was not a feature that would have rendered the measure uncon-
stitutional by its absence. Take, for example, the following passage:
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any federal law or consti-
tutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by its plain language the
Proposition seeks only to embrace the requirements of the Federal Con-
stitution with respect to mandatory school assignments and transporta-
tion. It would be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of the State
thereby had violated it. Moreover, even after Proposition I, the Cali-
fornia Constitution still imposes a greater duty of desegregation than
does the Federal Constitution. The state courts of California continue
to have an obligation under state law to order segregated school districts
to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not there has been
a finding of intentional segregation. The school districts themselves re-
tain a state-law obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to desegre-




After declaring that the California electorate could have amended the
state constitution to impose no greater duty of desegregation than does the
Federal Constitution, this passage proceeds to list three ways in which the
California Constitution, even as amended by Proposition I, imposed a
greater duty of desegregation than does the Federal Constitution:
(1) as amended by Proposition I, the California Constitution imposes
on state courts the obligation to order segregated school districts to use
voluntary desegregation techniques (i.e., techniques that require the con-
sent of parents) to cure even defacto segregation;
(2) as amended by Proposition I, the California Constitution contin-
ues to impose on school districts an obligation to take reasonably feasi-
ble steps to desegregate, even when the segregation is defacto;
(3) as amended by Proposition I, the California constitution leaves
school districts free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effect de-
segregation.
91
The passage clearly indicates that the foregoing features of Proposition I
both singly and collectively go beyond anything that is required by the
Federal Constitution. If Proposition I had prohibited local school boards
89. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 535.
90. Id at 535-36 (emphasis added).
91. See id at 536 n.12 (Likewise, as amended by Proposition I, the California constitu-
tion "would not bar state-court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing for desegrega-
tion or any other purpose." Id.).
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from ordering racial busing, therefore, it would have receded from some-
thing that the Federal Constitution does not require, and no moreY
Further evidence against the Amar-Caminker interpretation of Craw-
ford exists in a passage in Crawford that explicitly compares Proposition I
with the city charter amendment that was at issue in Hunter.93 According
to this passage, Proposition I, unlike the Akron city charter, did not explic-
itly alter the political decisionmaking structure.! Furthermore, by impli-
cation, Proposition I would not have explicitly altered the political deci-
sionmaking process in California on specifically racial issues even if it had
removed the power of local school boards to order racial busing. This, of
course, is exactly what one would expect on the view that it is only explicit
alterations in the political process, rather than substantive policy enact-
ments like Proposition I, that were deemed by the Seattle-Crawford Court
as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.95
As we have seen, there were two prongs to Akron City Charter section
137.96 The first prong involved a repeal of all then-existing housing ordi-
nances. This prong alone did not make the measure unconstitutional. 8
The second prong, which did render the charter amendment unconstitu-
tional, involved an explicit alteration of the political decisionmaking proc-
ess on a specifically racial question which disadvantaged racial minorities,
i.e., the requirement that housing ordinances bearing on racial matters, and
only such ordinances, be submitted to a referendum of the general elector-
ate.99
The Crawford Court compared Proposition I with Akron City Charter
Amendment section 137 on these very points.1°° If the Court had regarded
the power that Proposition I left with local school boards as essential to the
measures constitutionality, it would have distinguished Proposition I from
92. It is true, of course, that the Federal Constitution does not require local school
boards to act to cure de facto segregation. But the passage doesn't assert this truism. The
passage clearly means that a state constitution that either implicitly or explicitly grants per-
mission to local school boards to order racial busing goes beyond any requirement of the
Federal Constitution in granting that permission.
93. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 541-42.
94. See iLd.
95. See supra notes 39-46,50-63 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
97. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 540.
98. Cf. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389-90 n.5 ("By adding § 137 to its Charter the City of Ak-
ron... not only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing dis-
crimination, but also required the approval of the electors before any future ordinance could
take effect.... Thus we do not hold that mere repeal of an existing ordinance violates the
Fourteenth Amendment').
99. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 541.
100. See id. at 541-42.
the Akron City Charter on the grounds that the city charter amendment al-
tered the decisionmaking process by moving authority on a racial issue
from the city council to the citywide electorate, whereas Proposition I left
school boards with the authority to order racial busing. On this analysis,
the contrast would have been between Proposition I's grant of continued
power to local school boards and the second prong of the Akron city char-
ter. Instead, the Court compared the power that Proposition I left with lo-
cal school boards to thefirst prong of the Akron City Charter, describing it
as less than a repeal of those aspects of the California Constitution that
went beyond anything that is required by the Federal Constitution.
Thus, even if the power to order racial busing had been removed from
local school boards, the Court would not have held that the measure had
impermissibly altered the political decisionnaking process to the disad-
vantage of minorities. It would simply have concluded that the measure
had filly repealed those aspects of the California Constitution that went
beyond anything required by the Federal Constitution. As it was, the Court
said, Proposition I was actually less than a full repeal in this sense:
Hunter involved more than a 'mere repeal' of the fair housing ordi-
nance; persons seeking anti-discrimination housing laws-presump-
tively racial minorities-were 'singled out for mandatory referendums
while no other group... face[d] that obstacle... .[4101] By contrast,
even on the assumption that racial minorities benefited from the busing
required by state law, Proposition I is less than a 'repeal' of the Califor-
nia Equal Protection Clause.... ['on [A]fter Proposition I, the State
Constitution still places upon school boards a greater duty to desegre-
gate than does the Fourteenth Amendment.1
0 3
This reading finds further confirmation in the paragraph immediately fol-
lowing the one above. The paragraph begins: "Nor can it be said that
Proposition I distorts the political process for racial reasons or that it allo-
cates governmental judicial power on the basis of a discriminatory princi-
ple."'1 4 Significantly, the rest of the paragraph makes no reference to the
authority that school boards retained under Proposition I to order racial
busing.
101. This sentence refers to the second prong of the Akron City Charter amendment.
102. This sentence compares the power that Proposition I left with local school boards to
the first prong of the Akron City Charter amendment.
103. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
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Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the Amar-
Caminker Interpretation of Hunter, Crawford, and Seattle
The view that a state is barred by the Federal Constitution from pre-
empting all race-conscious measures within its borders is strange enough in
itself. It would be even stranger if this view had been expressed, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, by Justice Powell, the author of both the Crawford
opinion and the dissenting opinion in Seattle. However, the view that a
state may create a right on the part of its citizens to be free of court-ordered
racial busing but may not create a right on the part of its citizens to be free
of racial busing when it is ordered by a local school board, is more than
just exceedingly odd. There is actually a fatal constitutional objection to
it.
According to Amar and Caminker, a state is barred from creating a
right on the part of its citizens to be free of racial busing when it is ordered
by a local school board because racial busing is arguably in the interest of
minorities, and because a prohibition at the state level that preempts busing
at the local level places impermissible burdens on the political rights of
minorities. 05 The problem with this view is the prohibition obviously runs
in only one direction: there is no similar prohibition against political
structures that burden the interests of whites. It follows that the Fourteenth
Amendment grants political rights to minorities that it denies to the major-
ity. Astonishingly, Amar and Caminker do not shrink from this implica-
tion:
A state constitution may be amended so as to repeal or modify pre-
existing constitutional provisions, even those that have been interpreted
in a manner favoring a racial minority. But a state constitution may not
be amended in a direction that disadvantages the racial minority if the
effect of such amendment would be to withdraw pre-existing local or
state legislative authority [emphasis added] in a manner that is 'racial in
character.' We acknowledge that, so understood, the Hunter doctrine
has what some might perceive as afar-reaching consequence.106 With
respect to a given issue that is 'racial in character,' a state constitution
may either remain neutral or prescribe norms favorable to racial minori-
ties (which can later be repealed). But a state constitution can never
entrench a substantive norm with respect to an issue that is 'racial in
character' in a direction that disadvantages a racial minority. For exam-
ple, a constitution can mandate affirmative action, but it can never se-
lectively prohibit it and thus foreclose the possibility of minority success
in more accessible political arenas. 17
105. Id.
106. This is an understatement: the consequence is not just far-reaching, it is preposter-
ous.
107. Amar & Caminker, supra note 3, at 1052 (emphasis added).
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On this view, whites, in order to defend themselves against racial dis-
crimination by governmental entities, must be prepared to combat affirma-
tive action preferences now and forever (or at least until the Fourteenth
Amendment is repealed) at each and every level of state and local govern-
ment. Whites cannot save themselves from this unpleasant task-which
we know from experience will subject them to cries of "racism"--by
working to amend their state constitution. Minorities, on the other hand,
labor under no such restriction of their political rights.
The asserted constitutional doctrine has particularly counterintuitive
consequences at the federal level, which is arguably even more remote
from local racial politics than a state constitution. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in his concurring opinion in Johnson v. Transportation,08
"[p~rior to 1978 the Court construed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as an ab-
solute blanket prohibition against discrimination which neither required
nor permitted discriminatory preferences for any group, minority or major-
ity."1°9 No one could possibly have supposed that, under this construction,
the Civil Rights Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment or that a state
constitutional provision which fully conformed with the Civil Rights Act,
as. it was then interpreted, was unconstitutional. According to the Amar-
Caminker interpretation of the Hunter doctrine, however, the Civil Rights
Act, in its original meaning and as it was interpreted by the Court prior to
1978, was arguably unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
all state constitutional provisions at that time having the same effect were
also unconstitutional.110
Typically, legal opponents of Proposition 209 deny that they are
committed to the view that minorities have a constitutional right to prefer-
ential treatment. However, the view that a state constitution is permitted to
altogether prohibit racial discrimination against minorities, but is pre-
cluded from altogether prohibiting racial preferences in their favor clearly
entails preferential treatment for minorities in some form or other. Under
the Amar-Caminker interpretation of Seattle and Crawford, it turns out that
this preferential treatment lies in the domain of political rights.
It is true that the Hunter Court stated: "[tihe majority needs no pro-
tection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum might be bother-
108. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
109. Id. at 642-43 (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. Cf. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 498 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting) ('Indeed, under the
iourt's theory one must wonder whether--under the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment--even the Federal Government could assert its superior authority to
regulate in these areas."). As I have already argued, the Court majority denied that its ruling
and opinion in the case had this consequence. Nor did it accept any of Powell's other criti-
cisms. It distinguished its position from Powell's on very different grounds.
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some but no more than that." ' But this statement cannot be read as an
endorsement of a doctrine of special political rights for racial minorities.
Rather, the Court was simply laying out the conditions under which an ex-
plicit alteration of the political decision making process, like that of Akron
City Charter section 137, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
made the common sense point that such a measure cannot escape constitu-
tional scrutiny on the grounds that it subjects "[n]egroes and whites, Jews
and Catholics... to the same requirements if there is housing discrimina-
tion against them which they wish to end."112 One is certainly not com-
mitted to a constitutional doctrine of unequal political rights in favor of
minorities simply because the relative numerical strength of various racial
groups might be constitutionally relevant in scrutinizing explicit alterations
in the political decision making process on racial questions. It is clear,
furthermore, that any other reading of Crawford and Seattle would conflict
with fundamental constitutional principles. The Fourteenth Amendment
does not provide protection under the law just for minorities; it provides
equal protection under the law for all citizens. Similarly, the Civil Rights
Act does not prohibit discrimination only against women and minorities; it
prohibits discrimination against anyone on the basis of race or sex gener-
ally.
It is as grotesque to read a doctrine of unequal distribution of political
rights into the Fourteenth Amendment as it is to read into it a doctrine of
preferential treatment on the basis of race in any other respect. Nor is
there any reason to think that the present Court, which has taken an in-
creasingly hostile view toward racial gerrymandering to promote equality
of results in the political process for minorities, would find any merit in the
Amar-Caminker constitutional argument that decisional law presently
grants political rights to minorities under the Fourteenth Amendment
which it does not grant to whites."1
3
Conclusion
Acdording to the Seattle Court, a state may adopt race-neutral policies
that preclude race-conscious measures at lower levels of government.
What it may not do is explicitly alter the decisionmaking process on a spe-
cifically racial question in a way that makes it more difficult for racial mi-
norities to obtain legislation that the Court might deem to be in their inter-
111. Hunter, 393 U.S. at391.
112. Iktat390.
113. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that a particularly egregious
instance of racial gerrymandering constituted a racial classification and was therefore un-
constitutional unless it could be justified as furthering a compelling state interest).
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est. Since Proposition 209 is a pure policy enactment and does not explic-
itly alter the political decision making process on a racial question, it does
not offend the Hunter doctrine.
It would have been astonishing if the Seattle Court had come to any
other conclusion. To reach the conclusion that the Federal Constitution
prohibits such pure policy enactments and civil rights measures, the Seattle
Court would first have had to stretch the expression "explicit alteration of
a political decision making structure" to the point where it loses any clear,
recognizable meaning. Secondly, it would have had to commit itself to the
preposterous constitutional doctrine (which Amar and Caminker actually
find meritorious) that a state can have a constitutional provision prohibit-
ing discrimination against minorities at all levels of government, but can-
not have a constitutional provision prohibiting discrimination against
whites at all levels of government. Such a doctrine would have committed
the Court to the view that minorities have political rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment that the majority does not have.
Amar and Caminker assure us that although Proposition 209 is likely
unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent, there are "constitutional
ways to disestablish affirmative action programs throughout California."'
1 4
But they do not say what these methods are, and as the foregoing discus-
sion has shown, it is virtually certain that there are no alternative methods.
The statement of Amar and Caminker cannot merely mean that each and
every program of racial preferences can be repealed, one by one, by the
governmental entity that enacted it, since the majority might have to wait
forever for that to happen. Even if it did happen, the end result would fall
short of a statewide policy prohibiting racial preferences. In addition, the
crucial statements of the Seattle Court in footnote 23 can sensibly be read
only as acknowledging that statewide policy measures preempting race-
conscious measures taken by lower levels of government are not per se un-
constitutional. Such a reading totally undermines Amar and Caminker's
case against the constitutionality of Proposition 209.
Unless the legal opponents of Proposition 209 can find another, plau-
sible way of interpreting its plain, straightforward statements, the decision
in Seattle cannot be regarded as a precedent that stands in the way of a ju-
dicial determination that Proposition 209 is constitutional. Legal oppo-
nents of the measure will have to look elsewhere for a pretext with which
to strike it down.
114. Amar & Carninker, supra note 3, at 1056.
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